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Abstract—Modern cyber-physical systems are enabled by
electronic hardware and embedded systems. The security of these
sub-components is a concern during the design and operational
phases of cyber-physical system life cycles. Compromised
electronics can result in mission-critical failures, unauthorized
access, and other severe consequences. As systems become more
complex and feature greater connectivity, system owners must
make decisions regarding how to mitigate risks and ensure
resilience and trust. This paper provides an overview of research
efforts related to assessing and managing risks, resilience, and
trust with an emphasis on electronic hardware and embedded
systems. The research takes a decision-oriented perspective,
drawing from the perspectives of scenario planning and portfolio
analysis, and describes examples related to the risk-based
prioritization of cyber assets in large-scale systems.
Keywords— system security, hardware assurance, security, risk,
vulnerability, threats, mission assurance, cybersecurity, supply
chain, decision making.

I. INTRODUCTION
The national and global infrastructure is increasingly
dependent upon embedded electronic hardware components.
Whereas we used to be able to think of physical and cyber
systems as separate entities, we now must reframe our thinking
in terms of cyber-physical systems. The U.S. National Institute
of Standards and Technology [1] defines cyber-physical systems
as “smart systems that include engineered interacting networks
of physical and computational components”. Cyber-physical
systems encompass a broad scope, sometimes conceptualized as
having cyber, physical, and human dimensions [2]-[3].
As an example, modern vehicles contain hundreds of
embedded sensors and control units, millions of lines of code,
and Internet access [4]. While these hardware components and
embedded systems add many useful functionalities, they also
present vulnerabilities which can potentially allow malicious
actors to steal and/or remotely access and control the vehicle [5][7]. Other applications related to healthcare, finance, defense,
and critical infrastructure (e.g., the electric grid [8]-[9]) are
similarly vulnerable, and necessitate the assessment of the
security and trust of the embedded hardware which facilitate our
daily lives [10].
The supply chains through which these components are
procured and transported can be an entry point for untrusted and
insecure electronics, making their way to the consumer.
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Counterfeit electronics, which may be relabeled, refurbished, or
repackaged to misrepresent their authenticity, can make their
way into the supply chain and can be created through a number
of simple and advanced methods [11]-[13].
If counterfeit electronic components are integrated into
products, a number of consequences can materialize, including
reduced system functionality and unauthorized access to
sensitive information. Companies face impacts in the form of
lost profits, increased testing and repair costs, damaged
reputation, products with decreased reliability, and legal
liabilities [14]. Governments face even more serious issues, such
as the possibility of reduced reliability and functionality of
mission-critical defense systems [15]. One estimate of the
monetary impact of counterfeits on the semiconductor industry
in the United States is as high as $200 billion [16].
Many factors contribute to the abundance of counterfeits
within the supply chain, including the changing nature of the
supply chain itself. Outsourcing of the fabrication of electronic
components and the complex nature of the global electronics
supply chain necessitates the authentication of components
where the chain of custody may be unknown [17]-[19].
Obsolescence is another contributing factor, especially in
sectors such as defense and aviation where systems are in service
for longer life spans than the components from which they are
comprised. The obsolescence caused through diminishing
manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) means
that components must sometimes be procured from untrusted
sources, opening the door for counterfeits [20]-[25]. Finally,
end-of-life considerations, including electronic waste (e-waste)
disposal practices, contribute to the prevalence of counterfeits
[26].
While ideally all electronics would be purchased from
trusted suppliers, the reality of the modern global supply chain
is that this is not always possible. Components with unknown
supply chain histories require testing and authentication
techniques to ensure that the required levels of security and trust
are met. How to make risk-informed decisions under this
environment of uncertainty is a critical managerial task from a
supply chain and risk management perspective.
In this paper, we describe research efforts at the system and
application level. We describe cyber-physical systems research
efforts in areas related to risk, resilience, and trust, as well as
open challenges. A comprehensive cyber-physical systems
security strategy is one which integrates analytics, modeling

methods, business processes, and technological advances across
all levels of the system hierarchy and across the entire system
life cycle.
II. EXAMPLE: ELECTRONIC VEHICLE CHARGING STATIONS
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, including the charging
stations, electric vehicles, power and transportation networks,
and control systems represent complex cyber-physical systems
[27]-[30]. Connected vehicle systems and associated V2G
infrastructure elements are increasingly subject to security
threats, including security of embedded hardware devices [27].
V2G technology enables fleet-vehicle batteries to provide
frequency regulation (distributed shock absorption on the scale
of milliseconds to seconds) to the power grid when they would
otherwise be on stand-by for logistics operations. Severalminute intervals of battery availability at specified power
throughputs are reserved and sold ahead in an e-commerce
market. In addition to frequency regulation, V2G technology
can also provide demand charge management, reducing a
customer’s monthly demand charge (which can make up a
significant portion of a site’s electricity bill) by discharging an
EV to partially power other assets, such as a building.
There is an opportunity for IoT systems integration
(including manufacturing) of advanced chargers, network
communications, fleet vehicles, batteries, and the associated ecommerce transactions among power utilities and their
industrial customers. A software system that enables
interoperability between EVs, chargers, the grid, and other
energy assets (solar, wind, etc.) is a critical component of V2G
technology. Once these components are installed on a
customer’s site, an operations management system can
continuously analyze and execute optimal V2G monetization
opportunities available given a fleet’s logistic operating
schedule.
The most important of these properties, and perhaps most
worrying to industry, is the possibility of a cascading failure
following an attack or failure of electronic hardware. Is has been
shown for a simple coupled network model that cascading
failure effects lead to a drastic decrease in the number of links
and nodes that need to be removed from the network to break it
down into individual components [31]-[32]. Ganin et al. have
illustrated a similar effect for system recovery after failure [33].
III. RISK, RESILIENCE, AND TRUST
Risk analysis has been historically focused on answering
questions about what can go wrong, what is the likelihood of
something going wrong, and what are the impacts in the case of
the thing going wrong [34]. At the highest level of system
abstraction, risks can be associated with embedded hardware in
terms of technical, operational, and programmatic perspectives.
Technical risks are related to the intended functionality of the
system, whereas operational risks and programmatic risks are
related to the achievement of business and program objectives,
such as meeting cost and schedule benchmarks [35].
DiMase et al. described how supply chain risk management
is only a segment of the larger and more complex issue of cyberphysical security [36]. They defined ten areas of concern, from
software assurance to life cycle management, each with its own
regulatory governing bodies and guidance documents. They

described the need to take a systems view of the cyber physical
security challenge, including a view of how security
requirements flow down from operational, functional, and
architectural system levels. In particular, perspectives from
systems engineering and closely related disciplines such as risk
analysis and decision analysis are needed to synthesize and
integrate information across areas of concern and guide
enterprise level decisions [36]. In addition, they mention
multiple cross-cutting capabilities, such as decision analysis,
risk analysis, education and outreach, and training, highlighting
how security is a transdisciplinary problem, requiring expertise
from an array of subject domains [36]-[37].
One of the major difficulties related to assessing the risks of
counterfeit electronics in the global supply chain has been the
lack of obtainable data regarding the prevalence of counterfeits.
Moreover, situations where there are low-likelihood and highconsequence risks have been difficult for risk practitioners to
contend with historically [38]-[40]. Furthermore, not all security
requirements can be tested for complicated systems, meaning
that there will always be some undetected risk [41].
These concerns have led to some researchers to describe
cyber resilience, where resilience is defined by The National
Academy of Science as “the ability to prepare and plan for,
absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or
potential adverse events” [42]. The National Research Council
describes a resilient system as “one whose performance
degrades gradually rather than catastrophically when its other
defensive mechanisms are insufficient to stem an attack. A
resilient system will still continue to perform some of its
intended functions, although perhaps more slowly or for fewer
people or with fewer applications. Features of resilient systems
include redundancies and the absence of single points of failure”
[43]. With respect to cyber resilience, “cyber resilience (or
resiliency) is the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from,
and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or
compromises on cyber resources. Cyber resiliency can be a
capability of a system, a system-of-systems, a mission, a
business function, an organization, or a cross-organizational
mission; the term can also be applied to an individual,
household, group, region, or nation” [44]. Sheffi [45] proposed
supply chain resilience, which promotes the resilience paradigm
in terms of building adaptability and the ability to bounce back
from disruptions and stressors.
Several frameworks for cyber resilience have been proposed
[46]-[49]. Bodeau and Graubert [49] described the field of cyber
resiliency engineering as an interdisciplinary exercise founded
upon systems engineering, and drawing principles from allied
topics including dependability, survivability, fault tolerance,
contingency planning, and others. Linkov et al. [50] developed
a matrix-based approach for the development of cyber resilience
metrics, based on the stages of the event management cycle
(Plan/Prepare, Absorb, Recover, Adapt) and operational
domains (Physical, Information, Cognitive, Social). This
resilience metrics development process was applied to industrial
control systems [51].
A final related concept is trust. Trust in the context of cyber
security has been defined in multiple ways, including the
“qualified reliance on received information” [52]. In the context

of supply chains, the concept of trust is similar. Trust is
conceptualized as a belief held by an actor in the supply chain,
that another actor will act consistently and do what they say that
they will do [53]. Trust is related to reciprocity between parties,
the alignment of purposes, consequences for breaking trust, and
transparency of information shared between parties [54]. Mayer
et al. [55] summarizes trust as “the willingness of a party to be
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other will perform a particular action
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that other party.”
IV. RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING IN CYBER-PHYSICAL
SUPPLY CHAINS
Increasingly, hardware supply chains have been evolving
toward supply webs, moving away from linear procurement and
toward ecosystems that have been characterized as “dynamic,
hyper-connected, and collaborative” [56]. Managing risks
within these complex supply chains is a top industrial priority
and focuses mainly on avoidance and mitigation of
consequences associated with disruption events, as well as
balancing expected losses with risk management costs [57]-[59].
Teng, Thekdi, and Lambert [60]-[61] described program risk as
the process of answering the questions:
•

what are the scope of risks to be addressed;

•

what are the allocations of resources across time,
geography, topics;

•

and how do we monitor the efficacy of risk
management into the future.

relevant economic indicators for hardware networks and supply
chains [51].
Principles and methods of scenario building can be
leveraged, considering emergent and future conditions
involving environment, regulation, technology innovation,
markets and economics, population and workforce behaviors,
and other factors, both individually and in combination as
scenarios, as demonstrated in [62]-[64]. For each of several risk
scenarios of emergent conditions, a comprehensive risk analysis
methodology would elicit from experts the increases or
decreases in importance of criteria to rank IOT devices and
systems of concern. With assessments of each device relative to
threat, vulnerability, and consequence criteria, the system
analyst or manager would be able to study the sensitivity of
device criticality rankings to the scenarios, supportive of
continuous adaptation and improvement toward industry aims.
The analysis would assist to determine what scenarios or
combinations of risk scenarios are influential for critical
embedded hardware components in a large-scale system. With
this risk-based information, governments, scientific experts,
policy-makers and various other stakeholders can make
evidence-based strategic decisions leading to robust adaptive
management of cyber security within complex interconnected
systems and balance benefits, costs, and risks.
An open area of research related to decision making is that
of metrics for security. Rostami et al. [65] proposed several
technical metrics for security of hardware components against a
variety of attacks. Hagen et al. [66] propose four metrics for
assessing the performance of testing laboratories including
effectiveness, efficiency, capacity, and capability. However, a
unified framework for metric development across the various
levels of system hierarchy and abstraction has not been
developed.
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO PORTFOLIOS OF SECURITY
MEASURES

Fig. 1. Prioritizatoin of cyber-physical assets across multiple disruptive
scenarios of emergent and future conditions to support decision making.

Security and risk management need to go beyond the system
boundary, looking toward the wider system of business
processes and logistics networks, deriving relevant decision
making parameters related to the broader hardware supply chain
including specific resilience-enhancing initiatives and their
relevant benefits, costs, and time constraints. Research is needed
on methods, metrics, and testbeds for risk analysis of IOT
devices and logistics systems, with the goal to develop risk
analysis methods and decision making approaches along with

The risks posed by counterfeit electronics are numerous, and
there exist a large number of potential risk mitigation measures
which one can implement for a given system or across the
enterprise. The task of identifying what specific
countermeasures are used to reduce risk of counterfeit hardware
is complicated by the many potential options available. While
one can take a “defense in depth” approach and implement many
safeguards, the question remains as to which ones in particular
accrue the most security and trust benefits at the lowest cost.
Each mitigation has associated with it a certain effectiveness in
mitigating risks, but also comes at a cost. Moreover, mitigations
can be implemented in combination with one another. These
decisions must balance the inputs and concerns from upper
management and organizational department such as supply
chain management, finance, and IT.
The resulting question is that for a given level of risk
reduction and a certain budget, what is the optimal investment
strategy, in the form of combinations of mitigations, to
implement?
The risk reduction benefits of diversification are well known.
In particular, risk can be decomposed into two components –
systematic and idiosyncratic (also called specific, or

nonsystematic) risk. Through a well-diversified portfolio, much
of the idiosyncratic risk can be reduced [67-68]. For example,
Zhou et al. [69] applied a portfolio approach to flood risk
management infrastructure. Instead of each asset being a
financial security (e.g., a stock), they modeled the returns from
the implementation of various infrastructure assets such as
retention areas, levees, etc. They found that diversification of
flood risk management infrastructure in an area reduced the
losses associated with floods.
In the same way, supply chain managers and risk managers
require portfolio tools which can support cost-effective decision
making through the development of a portfolio tool which aids
the risk management investment decision process. Namely,
methods and tools are needed which address the optimal “mix”
of risk reduction countermeasures given several user-defined
inputs related to cost and target risk. The goal is for users to
investigate how to “buy down” the risk to acceptable levels.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As electronic hardware and embedded systems become more
prevalent within the systems on which we depend in our daily
lives, methodologies which provide risk-, resilience-, and trustbased insights into the system life cycle will become more
important to the organizations tasked with maintaining a secure
operating environment. While much research has been done on
the chip, board, and assembly levels, research at the application
and system level is required which integrates the technical risks
with considerations related to business processes and human
factors.
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Another need faced by industry and government is the
training of the current and future workforce to address these
dynamic security issues. Training for the current enterprise
workforce includes personnel beyond traditional IT
professionals, and includes management and horizontally
integrated personnel such as contractors. In terms of training the
next generation workforce, institutions must provide
educational curricula, hands-on experiential learning
environments, and training opportunities that meet the needs of
industry and government stakeholders [70].
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